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Combat
Airborne Operations
Of
the
11th
Pathfinder Company (Airborne) (Provisional), 1st Cavalry Division
The 11th Pathfinder
Company (Airborne) (Provisional) of the 1st Cavalry Division conducted 12
combat parachute jumps during the Vietnam War. In each case the jump involved the
infiltration of a small Pathfinder element into a non-secure area for the
purpose of selecting and/or clearing a landing zone (LZ) and providing
navigational assistance and terminal guidance to Army aircraft during air assault
operations. Several of these jumps were conducted at night. During the
testing of the Air Assault concept from 1963-65, the 11th Air Assault
Division’s Pathfinders developed a high degree of proficiency in night
parachute infiltration of small teams and the conduct of night airmobile
operations. This proficiency was retained when the 11th AAD became the 1st
Cavalry Division just prior to deployment to Vietnam.
The primary reasons for
conducting parachute infiltrations were the desire to maintain operational
secrecy and/or achieve tactical surprise, and/or the lack of a cleared LZ for
the follow-on airmobile force. The 1st Cavalry Division purposely did not
publicize these operations in the interest of security. The following summarizes these operations:
1. 24 December 1965. Situation: Since
mid-October, the 1st Cavalry Division had concentrated operations in the area
south of Pleiku in the vicinity of the Plei Me Special Forces camp and in the
Ia Drang Valley
close to the Cambodian border. However, aerial sensors had indicated
significant enemy activity southeast of Pleiku in the mountain chain south of
the Mang Yang Pass. The Division had not operated
in this area and planned to insert SOG long range patrols into the area to
obtain intelligence information regarding enemy activity (note: At that time
the Division had no organic long-range patrol capability). Concept of
operations: Operational security and secrecy were prime considerations in
determining how these patrols would enter the area. Thus the decision was
made to infiltrate at night a Pathfinder element to locate and establish a
night landing site for the insertion of a SOG patrol 21 hours later. The
Pathfinders would be extracted from the area by the aircraft used to land the
patrol. Execution: After operational planning and rehearsals at An Khe, a
four-man team consisting of Captain Richard D. Gillem (jumpmaster), SSG Rowe
Attaway, SGT Max Bennett and SFC Jim Jones (a SOG NCO) departed Holloway Army
Airfield at Pleiku, and at 0315 hours parachuted into a suspected Viet Cong
base area 35 miles southeast of Pleiku in the vicinity of Kong Nhou Mountain.
Weather conditions: clear, wind calm, no moon; jump aircraft: UH-1D; drop
speed: 50 knots; jump altitude: 800 feet; T-10 parachutes with reserves. Insertion
techniques were as follows: The tentative drop zone (DZ) had been selected
from aerial photos and confirmed by high-speed low-level overflight by the
team leader in an OV-1 Mohawk two days prior to the operation. The flight
route to the drop point was flown on the day prior to the operation by a
flight of two UH-1Ds at 1500 feet altitude with the team and static safety
officer aboard. The flight continued beyond the objective area to give the
appearance of a routine transit of the area, and returned to Pleiku by a
different route. The flight was monitored by Pleiku radar and a template of
the flight route with checkpoints and timing was prepared by the radar
operator for overlay on the radar screen during the operation. During
insertion, one UH-1D (with running lights on) flew the route at 1500 feet
under radar control. The drop aircraft flew with no running lights at 800
feet and visually maintained its position directly under the higher aircraft.
The jumpers were all seated in the left door of the helicopter and exited the
aircraft on a pre-determined time count after turning onto the drop heading
from the final aerial checkpoint. Despite the low jump altitude and radar
guidance all jumpers missed the planned DZ and made tree landings. The team
assembled, checked in with the jump aircraft by radio, and went into a “hide”
position until first light, but the parachutes could not be recovered from
the trees in the dark. At first light the team made radio contact with the
radio-relay site, and shortly afterward discovered they were not alone in the
objective area. The first indicator was a crowing rooster, followed soon
after by a reveille-like bugle call. The team leader requested an overflight
of the area by the drop aircraft in order to pinpoint their location. This
soon revealed that the team had landed almost 300 meters from their intended
DZ, and the sounds appeared to come from the area between the team and
the DZ (note: post-mission discussion with Air Force representatives revealed
that Pleiku radar could not provide the desired position accuracy for a
helicopter at 1500 feet altitude and 35 miles range). As the team carefully
reconnoitered the area during the morning they encountered several previously
used campsites, shelters and bunkers and a camouflaged two-meter wide
“high-speed” trail with numerous fresh footprints. They also heard the sound
of wood being chopped and observed through binoculars a group of
thatched-roof huts across a valley. Although no enemy personnel were spotted
it was apparent that the objective area was occupied and unsuitable for
insertion of long-range patrols. It also was apparent that it was only a
matter of time before the team’s parachutes were discovered hanging in the
trees. The decision was then made to
terminate the mission and extract the team. The team continued carefully
moving away from the enemy activity to locate a suitable single-ship LZ for
the extraction. About noon,
the team found an open space on a hillside covered with waist high grass and
several small trees that would accommodate a single UH-1D if a few trees
could be cut. However, the team also found unoccupied bunkers at each corner
of the LZ. Three team members were
assigned trees to cut with the rope saws from their survival kits and
low-crawled through the tall grass to their respective trees. As the team
leader contacted the extraction helicopter and two accompanying UH-1B
gunships by radio and pin-pointed his position in the LZ with a signal
mirror, he detected movement by a blue-clad individual about 40 meters off
the LZ. With the UH-1D on long final for pickup, he reported the visual
contact and requested fire support. The gunships sprinted ahead and fired
rockets on three sides of the LZ while the selected trees were cut to clear
the landing area. As the gunships maintained their overwatch, the UH-1D
flared into the LZ and briefly touched down as the team ran to the aircraft
and dove aboard. The pilot quickly picked the Huey up to a hover, turned it
180 degrees and made a maximum power take-off back along the approach route.
There was no apparent ground fire during the pickup. The team flew to the Plei Do Lim Special
Forces Camp about 10 miles away to linkup with supporting radio relay
personnel, and then returned by air to the 1st Cavalry Division base camp at
An Khe for debriefing by G-2 personnel.
2. 10 November 1966. Situation: An enemy force of unknown size
was believed to be operating in an area about 12 miles north of the 1st Cavalry
Division base camp at An Khe. There were no friendly
units in the area. Concept of
operations: Infiltrate by parachute a
six-man Pathfinder element into LZ Hanover (BR 426613), a non-secure area,
about 12 miles north of An Khe, conduct a hasty ground reconnaissance,
provide limited security, and establish a helicopter LZ for assault elements
of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry that would land 15 minutes later and
conduct operations to locate and destroy the enemy force. Execution: The Pathfinder team consisted of
Captain Benjamin C. Buckley, 1LT Luther L. Sanders, 1LT Ivan D. Dunnitt, SGT
Benjamin Villareal, CPL Frank D. Holder, and PFC William Krehnbrink. The DZ
was a small dirt trail surrounded by dense vegetation consisting of elephant
grass, brush and trees up to 20 feet tall. Weather: unlimited visibility,
scattered cloud cover, wind from the NW at 10 knots; jump aircraft: UH-1D;
drop speed: 50 knots; jump altitude: 900 feet; parachutes: T-10s with
reserves. The DZ had been selected during previous aerial reconnaissance. The
drop aircraft departed the 1st Cavalry Division base camp at An Khe at 0745 hours. A static jumpmaster was used in the
aircraft for safety purposes and to permit the team leader to concentrate on
enroute navigation. After exiting the aircraft at 0800 hours, all jumpers
landed from five to fifty meters from the trail without incident. The team quickly assembled on the trail,
conducted a hasty reconnaissance, cleared obstacles, set out a “T” for the
lead aircraft, and established radio contact with the infantry battalion
commander and inbound flight leader. The first four assault helicopters
landed at 0813 hours. There was no enemy contact, and the Pathfinder team was
extracted by helicopter at 0920 hours and returned to the An
Khe base camp.
3. 6 December 1966. Situation: Three or four bands of Viet
Cong, numbering about 40 men each, had been raiding and terrorizing friendly
villages southeast of LZ Oasis (ZA130250) and north of the Plei Me Special
Forces camp (ZA 165060). The 1st Cavalry Division had been conducting
Operation Paul Revere IV in the Pleiku area since October 1966 with a brigade
task force consisting of the 2d Brigade with attached units. The brigade
command post was located at LZ Oasis. There were no friendly units in the
objective area. Concept of operations: Infiltrate by parachute a six-man
Pathfinder team into LZ Tackle (ZA 206230) to conduct a hasty reconnaissance,
clear and mark the LZ, and establish control for the landing 15 minutes later
of a reinforced CIDG company with Special Forces advisors. The LZ was near a
suspected VC assembly area. Execution: The Pathfinder team consisted of 1LT
Charles B. Fitt, Sgt Barry J. Crites, PFC Ronald L. Lunde, PFC John
Gillaspie, PFC William F. Lannigan and PFC Hector V. Lozoya. The terrain in
and around the DZ was covered with bushes and small trees four to eight feet
tall. Weather: clear, 18-20 knots wind from the NE; drop aircraft: UH-1D;
drop speed: 50 knots; jump altitude: 500 feet; parachutes: T-10s with
reserves. A static jumpmaster was used in the aircraft to permit the
jumpmaster to concentrate on enroute navigation. The team staged from the
Plei Me Special Forces camp, and the plan called for a gunship to fly over
the DZ and mark the area with a smoke grenade for the following drop
aircraft. The gunship would then orbit north of the DZ to provide on-call
fire support. At 1000 hours the Pathfinder team exited the aircraft. The low
jump altitude partially offset the effect of the high winds and all jumpers
landed fairly close together. Once on the ground the team
quickly assembled, made a hasty reconnaissance, established communications
with the gunship, inbound flight leader and the infantry battalion
commander, and cleared and marked the LZ to accommodate four UH-1Ds in
diamond formation. They also setup an HRT-2A radio homing beacon to assist
the inbound flight leader in locating the LZ. The CIDG company
began landing at 1018 hours in four-ship increments. Once the CIDG company
was on the ground and assembled the Pathfinders were extracted and returned
by air to LZ Oasis. An after-action review concluded that from a 500-foot
jump altitude at a slow drop speed a reserve parachute would be useless.
Unless it was necessary to jump from that altitude to achieve required
landing accuracy, 800-900 feet should be the minimum jump altitude for future
operations.
4. 16 December 1966. Situation: Elements of
the 2d VC Regiment were suspected to be located in the Soui Ca Valley
or in the surrounding mountains. The VC frequently came to the village of Long Dinh
at the mouth of the Soui Ca valley to buy food. The 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry, located at
LZ Hammonds (BR 878540), would conduct a night air assault into the Soui Ca Valley
to move to and establish a blocking position further up the valley. The DZ
was located near the mouth of the valley and consisted of rice paddies
surrounded by hedgerows and a few scattered huts with a river to the east.
There were no friendly units in the vicinity. Concept of operations:
Infiltrate a Pathfinder team by parachute into LZ Taylor (BR 813603) to
establish a night LZ for Company D, 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry that would
land 30 minutes later. The primary consideration for infiltrating Pathfinders
at night and not employing an artillery preparation or illumination on the LZ
was to achieve operational surprise. However, artillery fires and
illumination were available on call. Execution: Several days were available
for operational planning and coordination. Pathfinders and pilots conducted
an aerial recon and dress rehearsal. The Pathfinder team consisted of 1LT
Luther L. Sanders, SSG James R. Martin and CPL Carl L. Weaver. Weather: no
moon, scattered clouds, light wind from the north; drop aircraft: UH-1D; drop
speed: 50 knots; drop altitude: 800 feet; T-10 parachutes with reserves. The
team staged from LZ Hammonds, departing at 2015 hours. The jumpmaster used a
radar vector and visual checkpoints for enroute navigation. The team jumped at 2030 hours and landed
fairly close together. Immediately upon
landing they quickly assembled, conducted a hasty recon of the landing zone
using a starlight scope, and established communications with the inbound
flight leader and the infantry battalion commander. They quickly set up a
four-ship LZ using a lighted tee for the lead aircraft and single lights for
the landing point for each of the other aircraft. They also set up a glide
slope indicator for the lead aircraft of each four-ship formation and used an
SE-11 light gun for long-range visual signaling. At 2055 hours the first
assault helicopters landed. The company completed the landing and assembled
without enemy contact on the LZ, and the Pathfinder team was extracted at
2115 hours.
5. 25 January 1967. Situation: The coastal area around Dam Tra O Lake
(BR 980820) about 10 miles southeast of Bong Son was known to be an enemy
infiltration area. Elements of the 18th VC Regiment were also thought to be
in the area. The 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, located at LZ Uplift (BR
920753), was planning an operation around Dam Tra O Lake.
The DZ was located on a sandy spit between the lake and the South
China Sea and consisted of
rolling sand dunes and scattered brush. The village of An Hoa was located
near the DZ. Concept of operations: Infiltrate by parachute an eight-man Pathfinder
team into LZ Moon (BR 985852) to recon the area and establish a night landing
zone for an airmobile assault by Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry.
Aerial rocket artillery (ARA) and tube artillery were on call. The decision
was made to infiltrate Pathfinders ahead of the assault echelon because of
the danger of landing helicopters in formation at night on rolling sand dunes
and the desire to achieve surprise. Execution: The mission was received at
1200 hours and executed at 2000 hours on the same day. Preparation for the
operation included an overflight of the DZ by the team, and rehearsals of the
plan for assembly and actions on the LZ.
The Pathfinder team consisted of Captain Benjamin C. Buckley (jumpmaster),
1LT Charles B. Fitt, 1LT Ronald B. Flynn, SGT Barry J. Crites, SGT Richard C.
Cunningham, CPL Roger C. Moak, PFC David K. Flick and PFC Ronald C. Lunde.
Weather: clear with a full moon; 3-5 knots wind from the north; drop
aircraft: UH-1D; drop speed: 50 knots; jump altitude: 900 feet; T-10
parachutes with reserves. The team departed LZ Uplift at 2000 hours.
Navigation to the DZ was by radar vector and visual checkpoints. Aerial
rocket artillery helicopters were orbiting several miles north of the DZ on
call, and tube artillery fires also were preplanned and on call. As soon as
the jumpers exited the aircraft at 2015 hours, small arms and automatic
weapons fire erupted from the village near the DZ. The Pathfinders slipped
toward the planned LZ and the first jumpers on the ground returned fire to
cover those still in the air. Assembly on the ground was delayed and
reconnaissance limited because of the enemy fire, but each Pathfinder moved
as quickly as possible to their preplanned positions on the LZ. The team leader established radio contact
with the inbound flight leader and infantry battalion commander as the team
began to place out navigational aids. A standard five-light “T” of MX-290
lanterns supplemented with strobe lights and a glide slope indicator were
emplaced for the lead aircraft with single landing lights marking the
touchdown points of other aircraft in the formation. At 2038 hours the
landing lights were turned on and the first aircraft landed at 2040. Because
of the sporadic enemy fire and blowing sand the aircraft were directed to
land in two-ship sections at 15-second intervals. There were no casualties or
aircraft hit by the enemy fire. The ARA aircraft soon after engaged and
destroyed a squad-size enemy force attempting to escape by boat across Dam Tra O Lake. One Pathfinder remained on the LZ to
accompany the infantry company on their sweep and the rest were extracted on
the last helicopter. The after-action review of this operation determined
that the 900-foot jump altitude resulted in too much exposure in the air for
the jumpers and too large a landing pattern on the ground.
6. February through July 1967.
During this period,
elements of the 11th Pathfinder Company conducted seven different parachute
infiltrations in support of airmobile operations in the vicinity of Phan Thiet
on the South China
Seacoast. Five of these were led by 1LT Ronald B. Flynn, whose Pathfinder
team was attached to Task Force 2-7, consisting of the 2nd Battalion, 7th
Cavalry with supporting elements. The Task Force was conducting Operation
Byrd in the Phan Thiet area under direct control of I
Field Forces Vietnam.
The primary reasons for infiltrating the Pathfinders were tactical surprise
and the need to clear and prepare the LZ for the assault helicopters. The
size of the Pathfinder elements in these combat jumps varied from three-man
to eight-man teams. Due to the previous experience at DZ Moon, and the small
DZs used, the drop altitude for these jumps varied from 500 to 600 feet. The
drop aircraft were UH-1D helicopters and the drop speed was normally 50 knots
to provide the required landing accuracy. None of the DZs were prepared by
artillery, and all of the missions except one involved the insertion of
Pathfinder elements by parachute ahead of a helicopter assault. In some cases
the LZs were secured, cleared and marked in as little time as 10 minutes
before the helicopter assault. Four jumps were conducted during daylight
hours, and sniper fire was encountered on two of them. On the daylight jumps,
a UH-1B gunship preceded the drop aircraft over the DZ by two minutes and
dropped a smoke grenade. This enabled the inbound jumpmaster to align the
drop aircraft and pick an exit point that would maximize the landing accuracy
of the team because steerable parachutes were not available. However, even
the 500- foot jump altitude did not always guarantee that all jumpers would
make it onto the small DZs. On all infiltrations, a radio communications
check with the drop aircraft, gunships, and assault force flight lead was
made by the Pathfinders as they descended by parachute. This provided a
timely on-the-spot report of the situation in and around the LZ. The one exception to the normal employment
of the Pathfinders occurred on 6 March 1967. An eight-man
team led by 1LT Flynn parachuted at night into a DZ with the mission of
establishing an ambush near the DZ/LZ until a rifle company closed into the
area on foot later in the day for extraction by helicopter. However, the
rifle company enroute to the LZ was diverted to assist an ARVN unit in
contact, and the Pathfinder team was extracted later.
A comment
regarding the size and composition of the teams on the various operations is
appropriate. In all cases the size of the team was based on the situation and
the mission. These factors, in turn, dictated the amount and the type of
equipment carried. At least two
AN/PRC-25 radios with extra batteries were a given in all cases. However,
night operations also required sufficient MX-290 battery-powered lanterns to
mark landing points for aircraft, an SE-11 light gun, a
visual glide slope indicator, and, on occasion, an HRT-2A non-directional
radio homing beacon and a starlight scope. This additional equipment required
extra men to ensure individual jumpers were not overloaded, and could quickly
move cross-country on foot if necessary. The size of the planned LZ also was
a factor. The bigger the LZ to recon, clear and setup, the more men required
to do the job quickly and secure (or at least outpost) the area. Team weapons
normally were limited to M-16 rifles, .45 cal pistols and grenades
(fragmentation and smoke), but on the initial operation the team armament
consisted of three M-3 submachine guns with silencers, four .45 cal pistols
and an M-79 grenade launcher. Machetes were the primary tools used for
clearing an LZ. On two operations the teams contained two officers in
addition to the team leader. This was done to give these extra officers
training as jumpmasters for future operations, but once on the ground they
performed normal team member duties as required by the mission.
The ability of
the 11th Pathfinder Company to effectively conduct day or night parachute
infiltrations permitted the 1st Cavalry Division’s airmobile forces to
operate around the clock and land in areas that normally would be
inaccessible to helicopters. This significant expansion of airmobile
capabilities also allowed the Division’s forces to achieve tactical surprise
by inserting forces into an operational area at a time and place unexpected
by the enemy. The positive guidance
and control provided by the Pathfinders also greatly enhanced aviation
safety. It is noteworthy that no aircraft were lost or damaged during any of
these operations despite the hazardous conditions.
The 11th
Pathfinder Company also pioneered techniques for the conduct of night
airmobile operations using a combination of Air Force or artillery flares and
Pathfinder lighting, and several successful night assaults were accomplished
using these procedures. But that’s
another story.
I certify that
the information provided above concerning the operation in December 1965 is
true to the best of my recollection. The information concerning the
operations in 1966 and 1967 was provided by Colonel, U.S.
Army (Retired) Benjamin C. Buckley from copies of official documents in his
possession. Colonel (then Captain) Buckley was Commander, 11th Pathfinder
Company during that period.
Richard D.
Gillem, Colonel,
U.S.
Army (Retired), 25
July 2002
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